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H e  went on to give an example of what he meant: 
“The Greek student must think that for the Rector to 
send a notice to his village to be read by the priest to 
the congregation is much heavier punishment than 
mere expulsion from ’the university.” 
Twenty-two days later, on January 27, the Minister 
of Education announced that as a first measure for 
the improvement of the universities and as a mani- 
festation of the government’s concem, 56 members of 
their faculties were dismissed-almost half of them 
from the university the Premier had so recently ex- 
horted to lead the nation. This measure was necessary, 
said the Minister; and it would now be possible to ful- 
fill the govemment’s promise to supply free textbooks 
to students. He did not enlarge on the somewhat less 
than obvious relationship between the two subjects, 
but explained that the delay was unavoidable because 
it had taken considerable time to assess “the evidence 
and denunciations” in the professors’ personal dossiers 
and to determine the cost of the books. 
There is no real contradiction between the Premier’s 
exhortations and the govemment’s actions. The  mili- 
tary junta (officially styled the Revolutionary Council) 
now governing the kingless Kingdom of Greece has 
been interested in the universities from the very be- 
ginning of its rule and has indeed already intervened 
massively in their life and operation. The  official record 
of more or less open legislative and administrative ac- 
tion which is reviewed here points clearly to the junta’s 
goals and concerns, to the channels and possibilities 
for action which it has prepared for itself, and to the 
use it has made of them. In view of the extent and the 
purposes of this intervention, emphasis on the un- 
doubted shortcomings of Greek higher education be. 
fore the coup d’ktat of April 21, 1967, is out of place, 
for it diverts attention from the more significant features 
of the current crisis. 
Of the two chief facets of academic freedom, uni- 
versity independence and freedom of expression, the 
latter has generally been less secure in Greece. The  effec- 
tive limits of expression of political dissent or of un- 
orhodox opinions have tended to be relatively narrow. 
Nevertheless, the general trend since the late fifties and 
until the April coup had been in the direction of i n  
creasing liberalization, in form as well as in substance. 
This trend was possible partly because of the autonomy 
of the universities and other institutions of higher leam- 
ing which has been repeatedly affirmed in their charters 
and in the 1952 Constitution. T h e  latter, in an article 
significantly located in its second part which comprises 
the Bill of Rights, requires that institutions of higher 
education are to be self-administered under the super- 
vision of the state and that their professors shall be 
“civil servants,” and as such protected by tenure and 
by definite procedures for appeal against decisions affect- 
ing their status. The  constitution presented by the junta 
in July retains most of this language but institutes at  
each university the ominous office of “government com- 
missioner” whose jurisdiction is left undefined. 
The  extent to which university autonomy was for- 
mally established in Greek law is made evident by the 
military regime’s choice of legal form for its measures 
concerning the universities. These have generally been 
“constituent acts,” that is to say, a special kind of 
statute which, in accordance with an untypically realis- 
tic quirk of Greek constitutional theory, may amend or 
derogate from the Constitution, although not issued 
through regular constitutional amendment procedures. 
THE FIRST 
The  first general measure dealing directly with uni- 
versity affairs was Constituent Act V, “concerning the 
‘cleansing’ of the universities,” issued in June 1967. 
According to it, professors and other faculty members 
of institutions of higher education may be suspended 
for a six-month period, which may be extended for 
another six months, on any of several grounds. Al- 
though such “suspension” is not the strict equivalent 
of dismissal, past (and present) Greek experience sug- 
gests that it is often a preliminary step before dismis- 
sal. In fact, most professors suspended under this act 
last October were subsequently dismissed in January. 
The  suspension is imposed by ministerial decision, in 
which the universities do not participate. No procedure 
is provided for a hearing before the decision or for 
review after it. 
T h e  grounds for suspension must be quoted at  some 
length to capture the flavor of their style-typical of 
the military regime’s rhetoric and enactments. Profes- 
sors may be placed under suspension: (1) if they have 
behaved in a manner “incompatible with their function 
as public servants and university professors” or generally 
inappropriate for university teachers; ( 2 )  if “their ac- 
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tions and occupations, outside their schools, indicated 
not devotion to science and to their position but utiliza- 
tion of these for other ends, not compatible with the 
properly understood professorial function, which was 
thus left open to comments”; (3) if they were un- 
qualified for their position, or otherwise entered the 
university “abnormally”; (4) if “their actions and con- 
duct show that they are not inspired by the appropriate 
spirit, compatible with the prevailing social regime, 
and by the national ideals.” 
When Constituent Act V was made public, it  was 
widely expected that the govemment would undertake 
forthwith a farreaching purge of the universities-as it 
did, on the basis of similar legislation, in at  l a s t  part 
of the civil service. However, the act was in fact applied 
for the first and last time four months after its issuance, 
when 11 professors were suspended. (The January 1968 
dismissals rested on a different legal basis.) This delay, 
and the limited application of the act, are in a way 
typical of the military regime’s attitude and manner. 
It has generally supplied itself with far more instru- 
ments of control and coercion than it has used-the 
main function of such instruments being to provide a 
continuing threat and compel compliance or a t  least 
toleration of the regime’s edicts. In its relationship with 
influential individuals, the regime has generally acted 
with circumspection and deliberation, bespeaking long 
years of training in bureaucratic infighting and intrigue. 
Jt thus accepted for a time the services of top-level offi- 
cials willing to tolerate it-for instance, the heads of the 
major financial institutions-forcing them out only 
after i t  had consolidated its position and no longer 
needed the respectability their presence lent it. 
THE OF f 
In late July 1967, new procedures were established 
for the widespread purging of the whole of the civil 
service. Constituent Act required all civil servants, 
including judges and university professors, to file state- 
ments affirming their loyalty to the State. The  official 
forms used inquired as to membership in, or direct or 
indirect cooperation with, any organization which 
“serves directly or indirectly the aims of the Commu- 
nist Party,” several left-wing peace groups being named 
as illustrations. After review of the statements by the 
govemment, through undisclosed procedures, the per- 
sons found not to be loyal were to be dismissed. The  
definition of “disloyalty” in this Act is a miracle of 
deliberate vagueness and ambiguity: it  covers not only 
those who are “motivated by communist ideas” but 
also anyone who “in whatsoever manner contributes to 
their spreading or praises them” or who “turns against 
the prevailing political regime or its fundamental insti- 
tutions.,, Although this Act purports merely to amend 
an already existing law passed at  the height of the 
civil war, in the late 1940s, the latter was far less vague 
and thereby of more restricted application. 
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A month later, Constituent Act X lifted the tenure 
of judges, professors, and all civil servants for a four- 
month period. (The  value of such apparently legalistic 
time limitations was clearly illustrated in the spring of 
1968, when tenure of judges was again lifted, for a 
three-day period this time, and 30 members of the 
judiciary, including the Chief Justice and several mem- 
bers of the Greek Supreme Court, were dismissed.) T h e  
grounds for removal in this Act do not include com- 
munism; they refer instead to lack of capability, im- 
proper conduct, lack of the “necessary moral prestige,” 
and “public propaganda in favor of a political side.” 
The  procedures established are left quite vague, but it is 
expressly provided that in the three-member commit- 
tees to be established for each Ministry, one member 
should in all cases be an officer. 
T h e  requirement of filing loyalty statements was 
widely regarded by Greek academics as intentionally de- 
meaning and humiliating. However, the country’s trou- 
bled political past has conciliated people to such de- 
mands and has conditioned them to treat such 
requirements as instances of bureaucratic red tape rather 
than matters of principle. I t  appears that the vast ma- 
jority of university professors did file the required state- 
ments. Still, it was on Constituent Acts IX and X that 
the January dismissals were founded; repeating the stat- 
utory language, the Minister charged that the persons 
concerned had “through their actions placed themselves 
in opposition to the social and political regime and its 
basic institutions.” 
T h e  faculty members dismissed, together with an 
undetermined number of older professors caught by the 
lowering of retirement age decreed in late December, 
constitute quite a large proportion of the total pro- 
fessional body Greece. No clear pattern emerges 
from an examination of the dismissal lists. The  elab- 
orate “rea~ons’~ given in the official decision are of 
little help-they are vague and repetitious, with intrigu- 
ing but obscure variations in language. In 46 of the 
cases, the express grounds given are political in nature: 
professors are charged with “support for a certain po- 
litical side” (the Center Union party is clearly implied, 
although not named) , with “generally following the 
communist party line,” and with political bias when 
dealing with students. There is no apparent pattem in 
terms of academic disciplines: those dismissed on such 
charges include professors of medicine, law, architecture, 
political science, philology, natural sciences, and eco- 
nomics. In  the remaining 10 cases, the charges are non- 
political on their face: a leading legal historian is charged 
with rudeness to his students, several doctors are ac- 
cused of profiteering in the sale of their books to stu- 
dents, and other professors are charged with “improper 
private conduct” or “arrivisme.” The  list includes sev- 
eral eminent names in each field-nearly two-thirds of 
the dismissed are full professors. 
The  review of personal dossiers and the decisions on 
the dismissals were made by a committee whose mem- 
bership remains secret; it is said to have been composed 
of junior officers. No hearing was granted to those in- 
volved before the decisions were taken. I t  was an- 
nounced later that procedures would be set up for 
review of individual cases; the Premier stressed his will- 
ingness to forgive and reinstate those who sincerely r e  
pent their past transgressions and affirm their loyalty to 
the regime. Such procedures were established, slowly 
and with obvious reluctance. But, as of July 1968, no 
actual review of dismissals had been undertaken and, 
therefore, no reinstatements had been announced. 
Not only professors, but students as well, are now 
required to affirm and prove their loyalty and are re- 
warded or penalized for their political opinions. In 
1967, students applying for admission to universities 
and other schools were required to request local police 
authorities to file certificates of loyalty on their behalf 
( the content of such certificates is normally not com- 
municated to the applicants). I t  is expressly provided 
in the related decree that those found disloyal are not 
to be included in the official lists of entrants, regardless 
of their performance in the entrance examinations. In 
June 1968, it was briefly announced, on the basis appar- 
ently of a mere circular of the Ministry of Education, 
that no loyalty certificates would be required for 1968 
entrants. The  actual scope of this change in practice is 
not clear. The  military regime has gone even further in 
its concern for the political opinions of Greek univer- 
sity students. In an early statute, enacted in June 1967, 
it was decreed that students possessing “high convic- 
tions and irreproachable morals and character,” as certi- 
fied by their school principals and after further selec- 
tion by administrative committees, are to be admitted 
in derogation of the set admission numbers and regard- 
less of their performance at  the entrance examinations. 
I t  is not known, however, whether any students were 
in fact admitted under this provision. 
The  potentially most farreaching of the military gov- 
emment’s measures regarding the universities is the 
issuance of two constituent acts conceming the election 
of university professors. Until now, professors have been 
elected by the full faculty of each school or department, 
with only full (“ordinary”) professors voting, and have 
been officially appointed by the Minister of Education. 
The  Minister’s action was wholly formal in character: 
h e  had no choice but to implement the university au- 
thorities’ decision. This state of affairs is now radically 
changed; the precise history of the related legislation 
is in itself of some interest. 
In October 1967, Constituent Act XI, “concerning 
the election of professors of institutions of higher learn- 
ing,” was enacted and published in the Official Gazette. 
But it was never released to the press (which was until 
recently forbidden to report the contents of the Official 
Gazette, unless specifically directed by the government) 
and was never mentioned in public by any government 
official. Just before Christmas, a new constituent act 
was passed repealing the earlier act; in contrast, this 
was widely publicized. Wha t  happened in the mean- 
time is anybody’s guess. Some changes in the composi- 
tion of the Cabinet had occurred; pressures were prob- 
ably exerted by academics and others on their behalf. 
The  new act can be said to be an improvement, in that 
it does not violate university autonomy as openly as 
the earlier one; however, the intended effect of both 
acts is unmistakably the same, namely, the control of 
university appointments by the government. 
Constituent Act XI, the earlier one, provided for the 
election of professors and other faculty members by a 
special “council of elector professors” consisting of the 
dean and one-third of the School’s full professors, plus 
an equal number of full professors from other schools, 
all named by the government at  its complete discretion. 
When, as happens in most cases, there were more than 
one candidate for a position, the electoral council would 
“ e l e ~ t ’ ~  not one but two candidates and would leave 
the final choice to the Minister-who, it was expressly 
stated, could refuse to appoint either and order the 
entire proceedings repeated. 
Constituent Act XV,  enacted in ’December, amended 
this election procedure. Elections are now to be con- 
ducted, during a first stage, in more or less the tradi- 
tional manner, by the full professors in each school. 
But the election must be completed within a single 
meeting of the faculty; if, after two votes, none of the 
candidates receives an absolute majority, a final vote 
is taken for appointment to a temporary position. If 
that vote too is fruitless, the government can step in 
\and appoint at its own discretion one of the candidates 
for a three-year term. 
Even if a candidate is elected by an absolute majority, 
however, he can still be stopped. The  Cabinet may, if 
it  judges the election of a professor “unsuccessful in 
substance or insufficiently supported,” remand it for re- 
vision to a special council of electors, constituted in the 
same manner as that in the earlier act, with a limitation 
on the number of its members who cannot now exceed 
a total of 11. The  Minister also appoints the two rap- 
porteurs. Presumably, the Minister cannot refuse to 
appoint the person elected by this council, but it is 
difficult to see how an “undesirabIe” couId pass such a 
series of hurdles, unless he happens to have full and 
continuing support from every single faculty member 
in the school. 
T h e  government may further appoint university pro- 
fessors at  its discretion in two special cases: first, on 
proposal of the Minister of Education, the government 
may appoint an unlimited number of permanent ad- 
junct professors, attached to already. existing and oc- 
cupied university chairs. Such professors possess all the 
rights and privileges of full professors, with the sole 
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exception of the right to vote in university elections. 
They may presumably participate in and vote with 
respect to all other university affairs. Second, by a 
similar procedure, full professors of Greek origin a t  for- 
eign universities may be appointed to vacant chairs at  
Greek universities. In both cases, the Minister may act 
only after the relevant school has given its opinion on 
the matter. But only an %opinion is required, not a 
favorable opinion, and even less the school’s initiative; 
even a contrary opinion of the School would satisfy 
the act’s formal requirement and the appointment 
could go through. 
In the earlier constituent act, only the provision on 
professors from foreign universities was included. The  
later version added the institution of adjunct professors 
and set a time limit to invitations from abroad: such 
invitations may now be extended only for one year 
after publication of the act. Presumably, the univer- 
sity’s future autonomy is thus preserved although time 
limits have been known to be extended; only its present 
independence is sacrificed. 
Several provisions of the earlier, now repealed, con- 
,stituent act are repeated in the later one. Both provide 
that voting in all academic elections is open: the min- 
utes must contain full explanation and justification for 
each vote. But the later act also contains new provi- 
sions of considerable importance on a number of issues: 
The  professors’ task: with admirable conciseness, i t  
is stated: “The main mission of professors of institu- 
tions of higher learning consists in their teaching, re- 
search, and writing.” The  provision is not as gratuitous 
as it sounds; it should be related to the various grounds 
for purging listed above as well as to the military junta’s 
conception of the universities’ role in the rebirth of the 
nation. A partial implementation of this description 
may be found in another provision which imposes on 
every professor the obligation to publish, within 18 
months, “a treatise or manual containing his lectures.” 
The  consequences of disloyalty: “assistant professors” 
(as the Greek equivalent of privatdozenten is usually 
-and rather incorrectly-translated) who are found 
disloyal are deprived of the right to  teach (which they 
cannot exercise anyway without special university ac- 
tion) and of their title; they apparently retain their 
diploma and doctorate. Some of the January dismissals 
were based on this provision. 
Further intervention: the act states that the charters 
of universities and other institutions of higher educa- 
tion “may be amended by statute.” Since this was 
equally true before, this provision must be read to refer 
to the procedure for such amendments, rather than to 
the form of their final enactment. In the past, univer- 
sity charters could be amended only through procedures 
involving active collaboration on the part of the institu- 
tions themselves. Now, presumably, the govemment 
can unilaterally amend the charters without consulting 
the institutions. 
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To cap this legal-looking structure, Constituent Act 
X V  states expressly that no recourse is possible against 
any action taken under it before the Council of State 
-the nation’s top administrative tribunal, normally 
competent to void administrative acts contrary to a 
statute or to the Constitution. The  government thus 
remains the sole judge of the meaning of all legal pro- 
visions and of the propriety of their application. This 
uniform clause, found in most of the recent constituent 
acts, is almost refreshing in its candor. After wading 
through the legalistic formalism of the other provi- 
sions one is brought back to reality by this clear asser- 
tion of the prerogatives of power. 
THE UNIVERSITIES 
Review of the junta’s record of action, with regard 
to the universities, places in their proper context Colonel 
Papadopoulos’ mobilization call and the dismissal of 
the university professors. Far from being contradictory, 
these actions are consistent parts of a single pattem. 
The  military government’s relative slowness in asserting 
full control over the universities should not be con- 
strued either as softness or as lack of interest; it  is 
rather the strategist’s respect for immediate needs and 
established priorities. I t  is only after disposing of opposi- 
tion in the armed forces, where nearly one-fourth of all 
officers have been ,dismissed. or “retired,” and the 
civil service, where continuing purges are. taking place, 
that the military junta has moved in force against the 
universities. 
The  legislative measures described have been only a 
first step. Since early January, the Prime Minister, the 
Deputy Premier, and the Minister of Education have 
delivered innumerable speeches at  universities, insistent- 
ly reminding faculty members and students of their 
duties to the nation and requiring their specific and 
continuing cooperation with the government. A circular 
from the Premier’s office in February asked for the uni- 
versities’ collaboration in setting goals for tlie spiritual 
rebirth of the nation; the universities were directed to 
designate some faculty members to assist the govern- 
ment in specified areas : intemational relations, political 
institutions, social and economic problems, cultural and 
artistic questions. Somewhat more indirectly, a cam- 
paign has been mounted to have groups of professors 
and students tour the countryside and the villages to 
discuss the work of the govemment. Still more in- 
directly, the government has been keeping up well- 
publicized pressure on the universities to fill all vacant 
professorial chairs and to create new ones. Benevolent 
on its face, this insistence must be seen in the light of 
the election procedures already described; it can be 
realistically understood then as a further step in pack- 
ing universities with the regime’s favorites. 
I t  cannot be contested that the militay govemment 
has found some ready collaboration from within the 
universities. Greek universities have generally been con- 
servative institutions and some of their more extremist 
(or opportunistic) professors have volunteered their 
services to the military. Others have been reluctant to 
resist the pressures directly or indirectly exerted by the 
government. University professors have thus been visi- 
ble in their support for and cooperation with the mili- 
tary regime. Early in 1968, the Faculty of Law in Athens 
elected three new professors; all three of them were 
fairly well known as scholars and their election could 
probably be justified on the merits. I t  is not irrelevant 
to note, however, that two of the new professors, both 
elected to public law chairs, were members of the com- 
mittee on the amendment of the Constitution ap- 
pointed by the military junta. 
At the same time, what is probably a majority of 
faculty members and students in Greek universities 
have continued to resist, by various methods and to 
varying degrees. In late January 1968, just before the 
dismissals were announced, a law professor at  Thessalo- 
niki lectured on the need for courage and the respon- 
sibility of the intellectuals, and developed the theme of 
“constitutional law as a technique for political free- 
dom.” About the same time, a young assistant professor 
of literature read to his class, in a valedictory meeting, 
a long patriotic poem by an eminent contemporary 
Greek poet. Both were lustily applauded by their stu- 
dents; in addition to being dismissed, both were placed 
under house arrest by the govemment for several days. 
In early February, the “resignation” of an eminent 
philologist was announced; in a strange sequel, three 
other resignations were first announced and then OB- 
cially denied. In most instances, however, the resistance 
of academics takes covert forms-it is passive and often 
consists in steady refusal to cooperate with the govern- 
ment, usually with nonpolitical excuses. 
Student resistance has generally taken different 
forms. Greek students are a relatively cohesive and 
activist group and their opposition to the regime can 
create serious difficulties to it and inspire further defi- 
ance among other groups. Youth is the one segment 
of the population where the military find not only the 
least support but also the least tolerance, partly because 
of the proverbial impetuousness of the young, and partly 
because young Greeks are not held back by the memory 
of the catastrophic civil war, nearly 20 years ago, that 
inhibits the activism of so many of their elders. Their 
resistance follows patterns similar to those of all under- 
ground movements: attempts at  clandestine organiza- 
tion, short demonstrations when possible, distribution 
of leaflets, writing of slogans on walls and blackboards. 
T h e  military government‘s reaction to such acts has 
been swift and overwhelming. In March 1968, after a 
flurry of student demonstrations, the National Tech- 
nical University of Athens and the University of Thes- 
saloniki were closed down for a few days. The  top 
administrative official at  the Technical University was 
forced to resign. Hundreds of students were arrested; 
most of them were released after a severe beating but 
several were held and are to be tried. After ‘reopening, 
the universities have been kept under close surveillance: 
a single door in each building is open during the day 
and the buildings are locked up early in the evening. 
The  harassing of students has continued. In May and 
June, one professor and several instructors at  the Uni- 
versity of Thessaloniki were arrested; they were still be- 
ing held incommunicado in mid-July. 
In conceming itself with the universities, the mili- 
tary regime has in part responded to acts of resistance 
but it is also attempting to achieve several objectives 
of its own, immediate as well as long-range. The uni- 
versities and their faculties enjoy high prestige in 
Greece, and this makes them especially attractive targets 
for the status-conscious colonels of the Revolutionary 
Council, particularly since the respectability of aca- 
demic institutions can be put to practical uses, through 
appointment of faculty members to “nonpolitical” posts 
on commissions and ministries. Moreover, control of 
the university faculties permits easier and more exten- 
sive control of their students. The  latter can be, and 
have been, controlled by the police, but there are ob- 
vious advantages for the regime in their being held in 
check by the university authorities themselves. 
Apart from such particular objectives, there is a deep- 
er reason for the military regime’s concem with control 
of the universities-and this is why the junta’s attack 
threatens Greek higher education in its very substance 
and spirit. Wha t  is involved is not merely a wish to 
place a few friends on university faculties; i t  is not even 
a simple question of stifling the criticism of obstreper- 
ous academics. It is rather an attempt at wholesale sub- 
version of the academic process with the purpose of 
converting it to uses contradictory to the fundamental 
nature of a university. T h e  ultimate objectives sought 
may be perceived in the brief quotations from Papado- 
poulos’ speech at  the University of Thessaloniki. The 
junta is committed to a radical and massive re-educa- 
tion of the Greek people as a necessary condition for 
the “rebirth” of the Greek nation. As the colonel’s 
chosen example clearly suggests, the commitment to a 
moral order and to national ideas implies for him a 
total rejection of the social, political, and cultural effects 
and preconditions of modernization-although the goal 
of economic development is supposed to be retained. 
Wha t  the military deeply and pathetically desires is a 
return to traditional values, more precisely to the tra- 
ditionalist authoritarian culture of an agrarian society 
long past. Schools and universities endanger such goals 
through their emphasis on youth, their encouragement 
of critical attitudes, and their nurturing of modern con- 
ceptions. They must, therefore, be controlled, so that 
they may indoctrinate students in the “revolutionary” 
govemment’s ideals, or so that, at  the very least, they 
remain passive producers of technically competent but 
socially and politically inactive graduates. 
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